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www.scmp.com Seven decades after hosting a summit that birthed the Non-Aligned Movement, Indonesia prioritises pragmatic ties over grand gestures
In April 1955, a city in West Java became the unassuming stage for a revolution in diplomacy. Leaders from 29 nations across Asia and Africa, most newly independent, converged in Bandung,
Indonesia, to chart a path free from the Cold War’s suffocating binaries.
Seven decades later, the legacy of that gathering – known as the Bandung Conference – still lingers, though the world it sought to reshape has transformed beyond recognition. Now, with multipolarity re-emerging as a driving geopolitical force, the principles of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) are being tested in ways its architects could not have foreseen.
Indonesia’s founding president Sukarno described the Asia-Africa Conference at Bandung as “the first intercontinental conference of coloured peoples in the history of mankind”. It promoted a platform of 10 principles including peaceful coexistence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, equality among nations, non-aggression, and non-interference in domestic affairs.
This year marks the 70th anniversary of that summit, but commemorations are expected to be subdued. While Indonesia celebrated the 50th and 60th anniversaries with grand gatherings under former presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and
Joko Widodo, the country’s foreign ministry has announced there will be no “major” event to mark the occasion this time.
For some, the decision represents a “missed opportunity” for Indonesia to reassert its leadership in the Global South. But other analysts suggest it reflects President
Prabowo Subianto’s broader recalibration of foreign policy – one that prioritises pragmatic partnerships over symbolic gestures.
While retaining Indonesia’s traditional
bebas dan aktif (independent and active) diplomatic stance, Prabowo has embraced a more personal, efficiency-driven leadership style. Analysts see his decision not to host a high-profile anniversary event for the Bandung Conference as emblematic of a changed geopolitical reality: a world where multipolarity has replaced the old bipolar and unipolar systems.
“In today’s multipolar world, countries like Indonesia see greater value in engaging with flexible coalitions that deliver results, while still upholding the spirit of strategic autonomy that NAM originally championed,” said Joanne Lin, a senior fellow at the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore and co-coordinator of its Asean Studies Centre.
“This trend highlights the growing relevance of smaller, issue or interest-focused groupings over broader, ideologically anchored ones like NAM.”
Indonesia still upheld the principles of non-alignment, Lin said, but platforms like
Brics were increasingly gaining traction as more pragmatic, interest-driven vehicles for engagement.
Prabowo formally secured
Indonesia’s membership in Brics shortly after taking office last year. The bloc – founded in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India and China, before being joined by South Africa in 2011 and
a slate of other nations in 2024 – is often seen as a counterweight to Western-led institutions.
Indonesia and the Global SouthNAM, formally established in 1961 after the Bandung Conference, was born out of a desire for an alternative to alignment with either the Western or Eastern blocs during the Cold War. Today, it boasts 120 member nations and held its most recent summit last year in Uganda. Yet its sheer size and internal diversity often render it ineffective as a unified actor on the world stage.
“Its large and heterogeneous membership makes consensus difficult to achieve, and the absence of binding commitments or enforcement mechanisms limits its effectiveness as a unified actor,” Christophe Dorigne-Thomson, a politics researcher at the University of Indonesia, told This Week in Asia.
However, while NAM’s global influence “has undeniably waned, its relevance has not disappeared”, he said. “Particularly as the post-Cold War unipolar moment gives way to a more fragmented and multipolar geopolitical landscape.”
This makes the Indonesian government’s decision not to commemorate the Bandung Conference this year a “missed opportunity”, according to Ahmad Rizky Umar, who specialises in Asian regionalism and Indonesia’s foreign policy at Aberystwyth University in Britain.
Such an event would have offered a rare chance “for Indonesia to engage with its Global South counterparts on such a large-scale”, he said.
In 2015, Prabowo’s predecessor Widodo brought together delegates from 109 countries, including Chinese President
Xi Jinping, the late Japanese leader
Shinzo Abe and former Singaporean prime minister
Lee Hsien Loong, to mark the Bandung Conference’s 60th anniversary. But Indonesia’s current president appeared to have little appetite for this sort of “commemorative diplomacy”, Dorigne-Thomson said.
His administration has directed state resources to flagship programmes like
the Danantara sovereign wealth fund and
a free-meal initiative for schoolchildren and expectant mothers – projected to cost US$28 billion annually – as part of the government’s ambition to raise Indonesia’s annual growth rate from 5 per cent to 8 per cent by 2029.
In this context, hosting a high-profile event to commemorate the Bandung Conference was unlikely to be seen as “urgent or necessary”, Dorigne-Thomson said.
“Prabowo is also more focused on great power diplomacy,” he said, adding that while the conference had represented “a high point in Indonesia’s anti-colonial and Afro-Asian diplomacy under Sukarno”, that legacy had diminished over time.
Al Busyra Basnur, Indonesia’s former ambassador to Ethiopia and Djibouti, said that while past commemorations had bolstered ties, the “Bandung spirit” should not be confined to an anniversary.
“If we only rely on [this conference] to look at Asia-Africa relations once every year in April, we are missing opportunities to increase connectivity between Asean countries and Africa,” he said.
As a former military commander and son-in-law of Suharto, Prabowo is closely associated with the “New Order” era of Indonesia’s second president, which aligned the country more closely with Western partners and international financial institutions at the expense of Sukarno’s Afro-Asianism, according to Dorigne-Thomson.
The manifesto of Prabowo’s own political party, Gerindra, calls NAM obsolete and outdated, saying Indonesia’s foreign policy should be “devoted to national interests”.
“In the absence of a major symbolic gesture, Indonesia will need to demonstrate through action that it remains committed to principled, equitable engagement with Africa and other Global South partners,” Dorigne-Thomson said.
NAM in today’s worldFor many countries in the Global South, NAM’s enduring relevance lies in its emphasis on strategic autonomy.
“The fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence espoused by NAM have become more crucial than ever,” said Samir Bhattacharya, an associate fellow at the Observer Research Foundation think tank in New Delhi whose research focuses on geopolitics and Africa’s role in the changing global order. This was especially true in a world where “great-power rivalries and realpolitik increasingly define today’s international relations”, he said.
Core NAM principles such as sovereignty, non-interference, and autonomy are still visible in regional groupings like the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Though Asean no longer explicitly aligns itself with NAM, the spirit of non-alignment remains important, especially for countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam that seek to avoid taking sides in the growing US-China rivalry,” Lin said.
However, as the global order grows more multipolar, maintaining non-alignment becomes increasingly complex. Southeast Asian nations, heavily reliant on global trade and supply chains, face mounting pressure to take sides as tensions between the US and China escalate. Strategic flashpoints like the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait and the war in Ukraine further narrow the space for neutrality.
“Under Prabowo, Indonesia is assessing where it should put its diplomatic capital,” said Alexander Arifianto, a senior fellow and Indonesia programme coordinator at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. “And it is focusing on Brics as its strategy to increase outreach towards other Global South nations.”
By joining Brics, Prabowo reversed his predecessor’s cautious approach towards the grouping, which was rooted in concerns that membership of the bloc might align Jakarta too closely with China and Russia, potentially compromising its non-aligned stance.
Although Indonesia had received an invitation to join Brics as early as 2023, Widodo hesitated, instead advocating for membership of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which includes the US, Japan and 36 other nations.
Arifianto cautioned that many in Western capitals perceived Brics as a geopolitical tool for Beijing and Moscow to expand their influence.
But other analysts say joining will open up markets and investment opportunities for Indonesia at a time when US President
Donald Trump’s tariffs are threatening to upend global trade.
How to navigate the economic impact of Trump’s tariff policy and the broader US-China trade war remains an open question for many in the Global South.
Indonesia, like many of its Asean neighbours, has called for engagement with the US, rather than retaliation.
Vietnam and
Thailand have already reached out to Washington to explore ways to reduce their tariff rates and protect their export-dependent economies, and more are expected to follow.
Arifianto said most countries were likely to pursue direct dialogue with the White House rather than attempt to coordinate a regional response – raising concerns that their efforts to appease the US could damage trade relations among Southeast Asian nations.
“Countries may turn inward,” he said. “I think under difficult circumstances like what we’re seeing now, most countries will try to focus on their own economic welfare.”
Arifianto predicted that more bilateral and minilateral cooperation would be the result.
“Countries like the US who have historically advocated for free trade and free markets are now turning back on that,” he said. “So what incentive do other countries have to not follow protectionist or developmentalist policies as well?”
As tensions between the US and China continue to rise, many countries in the Global South would like to adhere to the non-aligned principle of having “autonomy to pursue their own foreign policy interests” without pressure or influence from either major power, said Aberystwyth University’s Umar.
But their dependence on open trade and global supply chains complicated their ability to remain neutral amid the escalating trade confrontation, Dorigne-Thomson said.
“The room for manoeuvre is narrowing, especially as major powers grow less tolerant of ambiguity and seek to mobilise support across diplomatic and military domains,” he said.
“These pressures directly affect Asean countries, which, while committed to principles of neutrality and non-alignment or multi-alignment, face growing difficulties in maintaining such a posture in practice.”